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Abstract
We document the behavior of trade prices during the Great Trade Collapse of 2008-
2009 using transaction-level data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. First, we
nd that dierentiated manufactures exhibited marked stability in their trade prices
during the large decline in their trade volumes. Prices of non-dierentiated manufac-
tures, by contrast, declined sharply. Second, while the trade collapse was much steeper
among dierentiated durable manufacturers than among non-durables, prices in both
categories barely changed. Third, the frequency and magnitude of price adjustments at
the product level changed with the onset of the crisis, consistent with a state-dependent
view of price adjustment. The quantitative magnitudes of the changes, however, were
not pronounced enough to aect aggregate prices. Our ndings present a challenge for
theories of the trade collapse based on cost shocks specic to traded goods that work
through prices.
This research was conducted with restricted access to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. The views
expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect the views of the BLS. We are grateful
to Rozi Ulics for her substantial advice and eorts as our project coordinator. This research was funded in
part by the Neubauer Family Foundation at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.1 Introduction
The nancial crisis and global recession of 2008-2009 was associated with a dramatic collapse
in world international trade, in excess of the fall in production and signicantly larger than
the fall in GDP.1 The empirical literature has primarily focused on trade values|the product
of prices and quantities|and therefore is consistent with large declines in prices, quantities,
or both. The details of whether adjustment came about through prices or quantities matter
not only in order to better understand the large trade collapse but also because they may
improve our understanding of the sources of the recession. To address this we use highly
disaggregated data on U.S. import and export prices during the Great Recession from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and compare them to the behavior of U.S. trade values
over that period.
We emphasize three ndings for the peak period of the trade collapse, which for con-
creteness we consider here to be the period from August 2008 to March 2009. First, while
the dollar price of non-dierentiated goods declined by 17 percent for both exports and im-
ports, the price of dierentiated goods declined only by around 1 percent for imports and
0.5 percent for exports. The 30 percent decline in the trade value of dierentiated goods
therefore was almost entirely a quantity phenomenon.
Second, though durable dierentiated manufactures experienced a signicantly larger
decline in trade values than non-durables, the average magnitude of price changes on dier-
entiated durables was 1 percent or less, eectively the same as for non-durables. The only
categories that experienced large declines in prices were non-manufactures, consumer non-
durables, and durable intermediates, presumably sectors that include a lot of commodities
or goods with large commodity content. The contrasting behavior of dierentiated ver-
sus non-dierentiated goods carries through for dierent end-uses and dierent source and
destination countries.
Third, there were changes in the frequency and size of price adjustment, even for dieren-
tiated goods, that coincided closely with the start of the crisis. In particular, the absolute size
of price adjustment and the fraction of changing prices in a given month increased during the
period of trade collapse. Furthermore, the fraction of price increases out of all price changes
decreased, while the fraction of price decreases rose. Although noticeable, these dierences
1This collapse is frequently referred to as the \Great Trade Collapse," a term which appears to have been
rst used in Baldwin (2009).
1in price-setting behavior were not quantitatively large enough to result in considerable price
declines for dierentiated goods, consistent with the rst observation above.
A number of theories explaining the large disruption in trade have been put forth. As
emphasized in Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010b), many of these explanations im-
ply increases in the relative price of imported to domestically sourced goods, even within the
same tradable sector. For example, Chor and Manova (2012), Amiti and Weinstein (2010),
and a large subsequent literature emphasize the implications of tighter credit conditions for
international trade values or volumes.2 Chor and Manova (2012) nd that during the recent
trade collapse, U.S. imports declined by more from exporting countries which experienced
greater increases in their borrowing costs (proxied for by the interbank rate). Further, they
found that this eect was stronger in sectors more intensively requiring credit. Amiti and
Weinstein (2010) demonstrate that when the health of banks which provide nancing to
Japanese exporters deteriorates, the value of exports by those rms also deteriorates, even
relative to the value of their domestic sales.3
Exports may be more credit or trade nance intensive than domestic sales. An increase
in the price of credit might therefore have a disproportionate impact on export prices. Since
U.S. demand for imports of a given category of good is likely insensitive to conditions in
and relations with the exporting country other than through the import price, the above
explanations imply a strong negative correlation between declines in relative import volumes
and relative import prices at disaggregated levels.4
Simply put, if pmi represents import prices in sector i, then assuming a CES demand
specication with elasticity of demand denoted by , the relative demand for imports in
sector k relative to k0 can be expressed as,
vmk
vmk0 =

pmk
pmk0
1 


pdk0
pdk
 

dk
dk0; (1)
where pdi represents domestic prices, vdi = pdiqdi represents total spending on imports, and
2See also Auboin (2009), Campbell, Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2009), and Bricongne, Fontagne, Gaulier,
Taglioni, and Vicard (2011).
3Their primary results are estimated using data that preceeds the 2008-2009 crisis, though they extend
and extrapolate their results to apply them to the recent trade collapse.
4An increase in taris would also cause rms to shift sourcing from foreign to domestic suppliers by
distorting relative prices. Early in the crisis, there were concerns that explicit protectionism might be the
culprit, though a subsequent consensus has formed ruling out this explanation (see, for example, Kee, Neagu,
and Nicita, 2012).
2di represents domestic demand, in sector i. In the data we document, within dierentiated
goods, large movements in vmk=vmk0 are associated with negligible movements in pmk=pmk0.
This implies that explanations of the trade collapse consistent with price facts have to rely
on movements in relative domestic prices, pdk0=pdk, and/or relative domestic sector demand,
dk=dk0. It is not consistent with explanations that rely mainly on trade specic cost shocks,
such as nancing being more important for international rather than domestic trade, as that
would require variations in pmk=pmk0 to be the main driver of relative import quantities.
Our result that variation in price changes account for almost none of the variation in quan-
tity changes in dierentiated sectors therefore argues against the importance of explanations
emphasizing trade nancing and other export costs. We in fact corroborate the evidence
presented in Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein (2011) that U.S. manufacturing export prices rose
relative to the manufacturing producer price index (PPI), but our evidence suggests that
such a comparison is done at too aggregated a level to reach strong conclusions. Price move-
ments were concentrated in non-dierentiated goods sectors. Further, dierentiated goods
continued to exhibit a high degree of nominal ridigity through the crisis and conditional on
changing, they did not often increase. The relative price movements in the overall indices,
therefore, more likely reected changing commodity prices than trade nancing diculties
for dierentiated manufacturers.
Other explanations of the trade collapse are not inconsistent with the relative stability
of import prices. For example, Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010b) calibrate a
model in which imported inventories decline more than domestic inventories due to xed
costs of trade. Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2010) use a gravity model with
a global input-output structure to attribute the bulk of the decline to a collapse in the
share of nal spending on durables (both traded and domestically sourced). Since durables
represent a disproportionate share of trade, this compositional change generates a decline in
trade relative to GDP. These explanations need not imply that import prices rise relative to
domestic prices in the same good category.
There are a few previous papers that also study trade prices during the recent global
recession. Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) show the real and nominal declines in U.S.
imports and exports for 10 to 15 end-use industries. Outside of commodity sectors (and
sectors intensive in the use of commodities as inputs), they nd prices to have been relatively
stable. Haddad, Harrison, and Hausman (2010) look at the movement in unit values which
3they calculate at the 6-digit level. For dierentiated goods imported into the United States,
they nd that prices slightly increased. Behrens, Corcos, and Mion (2012) look at unit
values for trades with Belgium and nd that price declines played a moderate role in the
overall decline in Belgian trade. They consider dierences in the decline of trade values for
dierentiated and non-dierentiated goods, but do not consider the dierential behavior of
prices across those categories.
Our departure from these papers is that we use BLS good-level price data as compared
to unit values or aggregated price indices. We can therefore distinguish between market and
intra-rm transactions, better observe dierences in the prices charged for dierentiated and
non-dierentiated goods, and speak to the frequency of price adjustment and behavior of
prices when conditioned on a price change. By observing price series for particular goods we
can isolate price changes from shifts in quality or composition within each sector.
Finally, aside from our focus on the recent crisis, our work relates to other papers which
consider the dynamic properties of prices over the business cycle. Consistent with our nd-
ings, Gagnon (2009) demonstrates that the frequency of overall price changes in Mexico
was relatively stable during their low ination episodes despite large variation in growth
rates, in large part due to oseting movements in the frequency of price increases and in the
frequency of price decreases. Berger and Vavra (2011) and Vavra (2012) document comove-
ment between price change frequencies and price dispersion in BLS micro data on consumer
prices, which they show is countercyclical. We do not nd such clear evidence for the cyclical
behavior of the overall adjustment frequency in the BLS micro data on trade prices.
The next section provides a brief description of our dataset. Section 3 contains our main
ndings on the behavior of export and import prices during the trade collapse, both at the
aggregate and across sectors and countries. We compare the changes in trade prices with key
macroeconomic variables, such as exchange rates, commodity prices, and producer prices,
paying particular attention to dierences between dierentiated and non-dierentiated goods
and between durable and non-durable goods. We also document dierences in price responses
between arm's length and related-party transactions. Next, in Section 4, we study the me-
chanics behind movements in these average prices, including the frequency of price increases
and decreases and the magnitude of the typical price change. Finally, we consider alter-
native margins of adjustment, including substitutions or terminations of existing products.
Section 5 provides our concluding remarks.
42 Data on Trade Prices and Trade Volumes
This paper uses transaction-level micro data on trade prices obtained from surveys admin-
istered by analysts in the BLS' International Pricing Program (IPP) from 1993 to 2009. As
reported in Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) and Neiman (2010), the BLS IPP aims to measure
prices each month for a set of more than 20,000 goods that are representative of the universe
of all imports and exports. Taken over the 17 years of dataset, the dataset covers roughly
60,000 dierent goods and well more than 1 million prices, after removing most imputed or
estimated prices which are not considered \usable" by the BLS and which we do not include
in our analysis. Observations are generally taken at a level of disaggregation refered to by
the BLS as an \item code", which is constituted by the combination of a good categeory
more disaggregated than the 10-digit level and a particular importer or exporter rm. For
additional details on the characteristics of the BLS data, see Gopinath and Rigobon (2008).5
Figure 1 depicts our construction of the import and export price indices and compares
them to the corresponding BLS indices. We constructed the trade price indices used in these
plots and elsewhere in this paper using an unweighted average of price changes in market
transactions, excluding outliers.6 While this methodology does not conform exactly with
that used in the BLS' aggregated price indices, Figure 1 demonstrates the close t of our
constructed indices with their \non-oil import" and \nonagricultural commodity export"
price series. At the time of writing this paper, we could not obtain micro data subsequent to
2009, but note from the BLS' aggregate data that the steady upward movement of aggregate
import and export prices shown at the end of Figures 1(a) and 1(b) continued from mid-2009
through early 2011 when the rate of price growth stabilized at close to zero.
The BLS IPP data are concorded with a 10-digit harmonized system code (HS), which
5See also the data descriptions in Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010), Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010),
Mandel (2010), Nakamura and Steinsson (2012), and Auer and Schoenle (2012), which also make use of these
data.
6For imports, we exclude price changes of a magnitude greater than 2 log points. For exports, the handling
of outliers makes less of a dierence. We include all prices as this generates the best t with the BLS series.
We construct our measures without weights because the use of a consistent set of weights over the full time
period covered by our data is unavailable (the weighting procedure used for the indices reported by the BLS
IPP has changed over time and we could not access all components of their weighting calculations). The lack
of weighting downplays the contribution of the homogenous goods to the price indices, and hence the BLS
counterparts that we track are the Non-oil import price and the Non-agricultural commodity export price
series. Consistent with the BLS' treatment, we measure price changes for continuing goods and ignore the
observations on the date of entry or exit into the dataset. Section 4.2 discusses further the extensive margin
over this period.
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Figure 1: Comparison of GIN and BLS Trade Price Indices
Notes: Log of import and export price indices in U.S. Dollars; August 2008 values normalized to zero (marked
by vertical dashed line). Solid lines correspond to average trade prices aggregated using micro-level data from
our sample and dashed lines correspond to ocial BLS indices available from their website.
we use to match at the 4-digit level with data on trade volumes publicly available from the
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). These data on trade values from the ITC are
monthly and exclude services. They are not seasonally adjusted.7 We also use the 4-digit
HS codes to match with the 2007 version of the Rauch (1999) classication, downloaded
from Jon Haveman's International Trade Data web page. We divide imports and exports
into dierentiated and non-dierentiated goods using this Rauch classication, where we
consider goods traded on an \Organized Exchange" or with \Reference Prices" to be non-
dierentiated.
We use the concordance from Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2010) to classify
goods as non-manufacturers, durable manufactures, and non-durable manufactures, as well
as to distinguish among these manufactures those that are capital, intermediate, or consumer
goods. The concordance for these denitions is available at the 2-digit HS level and indicates
what fraction of the sub-sectors in each 2-digit sector falls into each category. We label any
given good as belonging to a category if the concordance suggests the label at the 2-digit
level applies to more than 70 percent of the sub-sectors. If no category captures more than
70 percent of the 2-digit aggregate, we leave that sector unmarked. Therefore, for all our
analyses, the combination of subcategories need not total the full set of prices. For example,
some goods are labeled as neither dierentiated nor non-dierentiated, and the decline in
\all" prices need not always lie between the declines in dierentiated and non-dierentiated
good prices.
7Seasonally adjusted data are not available at the disaggregated level used for these categories.
63 The Behavior of Export and Import Prices
We start by examining the aggregate import and export price indices. One feature of the
data is the large and highly correlated swing in both export and import prices. Figure 2 plots
the log of U.S. import and export price indices, measured in U.S. dollars and normalized to
zero in August 2008, along with indices capturing the price of oil, the U.S. dollar's trade-
weighted exchange rate, and U.S. manufacturing producer prices (PPI). Starting in 2002,
the dynamics of all these indices are very closely correlated. After a long period of increase
(alongside with U.S. dollar depreciation), they all peaked in July or August 2008, and then
sharply declined during the following six months. For example, import and export prices were
growing at an annual rate of about 2.5 percent from 2002 to July 2008, then decreased a bit
more than 5 percent between September 2008 and March 2009, and nally quickly regained
about half of this decline by the end of 2009. The 11 percent decline in the manufacturing
U.S. PPI during the corresponding crisis months was twice as large. The swing in oil prices
(plotted against the right y-axis) was largest, with prices during the crisis dipping to a level
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Figure 2: Trade Prices, Producer Prices, Oil Prices, and the Exchange Rate
Notes: Log index series with August 2008 values normalized to zero (vertical dashed line, marking the begin-
ning of the acute phase of the crisis). Shaded areas mark NBER recession dates (March to November 2001
and December 2007 to June 2009). Exchange Rate is broad trade-weighted exchange rate index from FRED
(red line marked with circles); Oil Prices are spot WTI crude oil prices (right axis; black line marked with
squares). Blue thick solid line corresponds to Import, green thick dashed line corresponds to Export, and
cyan line marked with triangles corresponds to Producer price indices. Import and Export price indices are
aggregated using our sample, while PPI is the ocial series taken from the BLS website.
766 percent below their peak.
These large swings in import and export prices are closely correlated with movements of
the U.S. trade-weighted exchange rate, which steadily depreciated between 2002 and July
2008 at an annual rate of 4.5 percent and then appreciated sharply by 15 percent between
August 2008 and March 2009. This was followed by a rapid depreciation, although the
U.S. trade-weighted exchange rate remained by the end of 2009 more than 5 percent above
its July 2008 level. This pattern is representative of most U.S. bilateral exchange rates
with the exception of the Japanese Yen, which appreciated 4.6 percent against the dollar in
the months of crisis, and the Chinese Yuan, which remained stable relative to the dollar.
The aggregate patterns of exchange rate and trade prices co-movement are consistent with
positive but incomplete exchange rate pass-through on both import and export prices.
Motivated by these patterns, we use August 2008 as the baseline month in our analyses
relative to which we measure changes in prices during the period of the crisis. We do this
despite the fact that the ocial NBER start date for Great Recession is December 2007
(with June 2009 being the end date). The period preceding August 2008 is the build up of
the crisis during which most price indices still increased, and the acute phase of the crisis
began in September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
3.1 Dierentiated and non-dierentiated goods
The movement in aggregate price indices masks the very dierent behavior of prices for
dierentiated compared with non-dierentiated goods. The solid lines in Figure 3(a) plot
indices capturing changes in the dollar value of total U.S. imports (M) and the price of those
imports (PM), and the solid lines in Figure 3(b) plot the equivalent for exports. The value
of imports and exports both decline nearly 40 percent in the global recession of 2008-2009,
the rightmost shaded region of the plots. Overall import and export prices show a modest
decline of around 5 percent during this period.
The picture changes when we isolate dierentiated goods using the Rauch (1999) clas-
sication and plot these indices using the dashed lines labeled with superscript `dif f'. The
decline in trade values for dierentiated goods move largely with the aggregate gures.
Dierentiated good trade prices, however, do not exhibit the decline witnessed in the aggre-
gated price indices, implying the bulk of price adjustment is due to larger declines in more
8(a) U.S. Import Prices and Values
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Figure 3: U.S. Trade Prices and Values
Notes: Log index series with August 2008 value normalized to zero (vertical dashed lines). M and X denote
import and export values; PM and PX denote import and export price indices; variables with superscript
`dif f' corresponds to the subsample of Rauch dierentiated goods (dashed lines).
commodity-like goods traded with reference prices or on organized exchanges. These same
patterns hold for the smaller price decline observed in the earlier shaded region identifying
the 2001 recession (March{November 2001).
Zooming in on the recent recession reinforces this point. Figure 4 shows that declines
in the average price of imports and exports are almost entirely driven by price changes
among non-dierentiated goods. In fact, non-dierentiated goods prices declined by about
16 percent for both imports and exports, hence contributing signicantly to the overall
decrease in trade values for non-dierentiated goods. In contrast, the trivial decline of about
1 percent in the prices of dierentiated goods contributes almost nothing to the very large
declines in the values of trade for these goods, which by implication comes almost entirely
from the decline in trade volumes. Table 1 further summarizes the price movements for all
traded goods, as well as dierentiated and non-dierentiated subsamples during the months
of the crisis. Each column compares changes to August 2008, the month after which the
acute phase of the crisis began. We pick periods of varying lengths and nd that our general
conclusions are robust to the chosen endpoints. In particular, we nd that independent of
the chosen time window, dierentiated good trade prices barely moved.
3.2 Arm's length and related party transactions
Our analyses thus far only use pricing data from market-based trade transactions. It is well-
known, however, that transactions between related parties, or intra-rm trades, account for
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Notes: Log index series with August 2008 value normalized to zero. Solid lines correspond to Imports and
dashed lines correspond to Exports; circles indicate dierentiated good subsample.
Table 1: Import and Export Price Changes (% change over 2008m8)
2008m9 2008m11 2009m3 2009m11
Imports
All  0.5  2.9  6.3  4.9
Non-Dierentiated  1.3  8.8  16.1  11.7
Dierentiated 0.1  0.3  1.1  1.5
Exports
All  0.2  2.1  4.4  2.9
Non-Dierentiated  0.6  8.0  15.7  12.8
Dierentiated 0.1 0.1  0.6 0.2
Notes: Percent price changes cumulated to a given month relative to August 2008.
10Table 2: Changes in Market and Related-party Transaction Prices (%)
Imports Exports
All Non-Di Di All Non-Di Di
All  4.4  13.3  0.7  3.8  13.9  1.0
Market  6.3  16.1  1.1  4.4  15.7  0.6
Related-party  2.2  7.5  0.3  2.4  7.8  1.7
Notes: Percent price changes cumulated between August 2008 and March 2009.
a substantial share (as large as 40 percent) of total import and export values.8 Table 2
compares the behavior of market and related party transactions. As before, we use August
2008 as our baseline month and report results through March 2009, but we obtain highly
similar results for other time windows as well. We avoid much longer windows as these would
conate longer-run reversals with the response to the crisis episode.
Related party prices declined by signicantly less than did market transaction prices,
but the vast majority of this dierence was driven by the smaller decline in intra-rm non-
dierentiated goods prices. The prices of dierentiated goods, whether traded by related
parties or at arm's length, moved by little. For the remainder of the paper, as with the
analyses preceding this subsection, we only use data on market transactions.
3.3 Durable and non-durable goods
As emphasized in Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2010), Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar
(2010), and Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010a), reduced trade values in durable
and storable goods played a prominent role in generating the recent global trade collapse.9
We now look at the changes in trade prices and values of durable versus non-durable goods,
both for non-dierentiated and dierentiated goods. We report changes in trade prices
for the period August 2008 to March 2009, as in previous analyses. The trade values are
reported from June 2008 to June 2009, however, because we do not want the comparison
obscured by seasonality. Our conclusions are robust to changes of a few months in the
choice of any of these end points. The second panel of Table 3 divides imported goods into
three categories: non-manufactures (S), non-durable manufactured goods (N), and durable
8See Neiman (2010) for a detailed comparison of arm's length and intra-rm prices in BLS data.
9See Engel and Wang (2011) for an analysis of how the intensity of durables in international trade impacts
the dynamic properties of trade values in the context of an international RBC model.
11Table 3: Changes in Import Prices and Values, by Type and End-Use (%)
Prices Values
All Non-Di Di All Non-Di Di
All  6.3  16.1  1.1  32.7  48.0  24.4
Non-manufactures (S)  31.5  15.5  3.9  49.8  54.1  21.3
Non-durables (N)  3.8  8.3  0.3  16.3  19.7  18.5
Durables (D)  4.3  36.1  1.3  29.5  49.9  26.4
Consumption-N  2.6  5.6  0.2  12.0  15.2  14.7
Intermediate-N  1.1  1.9 0.0  19.9  21.9  8.1
Capital-D  1.1 |  0.7  22.4 |  23.1
Consumption-D 1.1 | 1.2  24.3 |  24.0
Intermediate-D  18.4  34.0  9.6  60.2  64.7  39.3
Notes: Changes in prices are calculated between August 2008 and September 2009; changes in values are cal-
culated between June 2008 and June 2009. The data contains no non-dierentiated capital and consumption
durable goods.
manufactured goods (D). The left panel shows changes in import prices while the right panel
shows changes in import values. We refer to the non-manufactured good category with an
`S' because it includes services, but we note that it also includes commodities such as oil
products, which is why it features the largest price declines.
The value of trade in durable goods fell substantially more than did trade in non-
durables for dierentiated and non-dierentiated goods alike. Within non-dierentiated
goods, durable prices dropped by signicantly more than non-durables, and we suspect this
reects a large commodity content in non-dierentiated durables. Once we focus on the sub-
sample of dierentiated goods, however, the price declines for both non-durable and durable
goods are equally small.
Next, the lower panel of Table 3 splits all manufactured goods into ve end-use cate-
gories. We divide the non-durable manufactures into consumer (Con-N) and intermediate
(Int-N) goods categories and divide durables into capital (Cap-D), consumer (Con-D), and
intermediate (Int-D) goods categories. Among capital and consumption durables there are
no non-dierentiated goods at all. The price changes for dierentiated durables in these two
categories are all less than 1.2 percent. The only category of dierentiated durables which
features a signicant price decline is dierentiated durable intermediates. These goods con-
stitute a very small share of total dierentiated durables and likely have a high commodity
12component in their cost structure as would be the case with, say, copper wire.10
These same patterns also hold for export prices and values, as we show in Appendix
Table A1. As with imports, though trade value declines were large within all subsamples of
manufactured goods, particularly durables, large manufacturing price declines were generally
concentrated only in the non-dierentiated goods. The behavior of durable and non-durable
dierentiated manufacturing import and export prices were hardly distinguishable from each
other.
3.4 Cross-country evidence
Finally, we consider the possibility of dierent pricing patterns across source countries for
U.S. imports and destination countries for U.S. exports. Table 4 provides evidence on trade
prices for some of the largest U.S. trade partners, organized by geographic location. For all
export destinations, dierentiated good prices did not decrease much and in general do not
show much variation. The price of dierentiated imports from some European countries and
Canada did have moderate decreases (of about 6 percent), but this decline still signicantly
lags that in corresponding trade values. For the European source countries the decline in
dierentiated goods prices likely reects relatively high pass-through of the depreciation of
the Euro into U.S. Dollar import prices, while for Canada it likely reects high content
of commodity-intensive goods in their dierentiated exports to the U.S. Notably, overall
import price indices from many developing countries outside of Asia decreased substantially,
but their import price indices for dierentiated goods did not decline. All in all, dierentiated
good prices did not change signicantly, regardless of their source or destination.
3.5 A look at the cross-section
Our initial look at the data suggests that there was a very limited trade price movement for
both dierentiated imports and exports, leaving the bulk of the dierentiated trade value
collapse due to reduced quantities. Non-dierentiated trade value declines, by contrast,
involved signicant adjustment of prices. This characterization remains accurate and rep-
resentative even when considering dierent relationship structures between trading parties,
10Prior to the crisis, trade in intermediate goods represented only 5 percent of dierentiated durable
manufacturing imports and 2 percent of dierentiated durable exports.
13Table 4: Changes in Trade Prices, by Country (%)
Imports Exports
All Non-Di Di All Non-Di Di
All  6.3  16.1  1.1  4.4  15.7  0.6
nafta
Canada  23.3  20.8  7.5  3.3  10.9  1.6
Mexico  6.4  6.2 0.1  7.1  13.3  1.7
Europe
France 0.5 0.5 1.6 1.2  15.5 3.3
Germany  8.1  7.7  5.5  2.9  6.8  2.0
Ireland 1.2 1.2 0.0 4.0 1.1 8.4
Italy  3.9  3.8  5.5  5.5  9.6 0.0
Spain  3.9  3.8  8.1  4.1  2.4  0.6
Sweden  2.1  2.1  3.0  1.0  0.9  1.9
Switzerland  6.2  6.0  5.0 0.3  1.2  3.0
U.K.  9.0  8.6 0.1  0.3  8.2 3.1
Asia
China 0.2 0.2 0.7  17.1  40.4  2.0
Hong Kong  0.8  0.8  0.2  12.3  18.4  7.3
India  3.1  3.1  1.2  3.1 2.3  0.7
Japan 2.8 2.9 3.0 1.3  2.4 2.5
South Korea  3.4  3.4  1.0  5.7  14.8 0.3
Taiwan 0.1 0.1 0.5  4.1  10.4  0.2
Commodity Exporters
Australia  11.5  10.9  2.2  2.9  12.6  3.1
Argentina  17.9  16.4 0.5  0.2  14.6 3.9
Brazil  13.8  12.9 3.6  3.4  6.4 6.6
Russia  37.4  31.2 2.8  5.1  6.9  3.5
South Africa  30.6  26.4 0.0 2.2 12.5 2.4
Notes: Percent price changes cumulated between August 2008 and March 2009.
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(b) Changes in Export Prices and Values
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Figure 5: Trade Adjustment in Dierentiated and Non-Dierentiated Sectors
Notes: Sample is as described in the text. OLS regression lines of change in log prices on a constant and
change in log values (regression slope coecients and standard errors are reported in Table 5). Each blue
circle (red square) corresponds to an HS 4-digit non-dierentiated (dierentiated) sector according to the
Rauch classication; blue dashed (red solid) line is the regression line for non-dierentiated (dierentiated)
sectors.
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(b) Changes in Export Prices and Values
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Figure 6: Trade Adjustment in Durable and Non-Durable Dierentiated Sectors
Notes: Dierentiated sectors subsample. OLS regression lines of change in log prices on a constant and
change in log values (regression slope coecients and standard errors are reported in Table 5). Each blue
circle (red square) corresponds to an HS 4-digit non-durable (durable) dierentiated sector; blue dashed (red
solid) line is the regression line for non-durable (durable) dierentiated sectors.
dierent end-uses of the goods, and dierent locations of the trading partners. We now
merge our pricing data with trade value data at the 4-digit HS sector level to further as-
sess whether there is signicant heterogeneity in price adjustment within dierentiated and
non-dierentiated manufactures.
15Table 5: Regression Coecients of Changes in Log Prices on Changes in Log Values
Imports Exports
Non-Di Dierentiated Non-Di Dierentiated
All Non-Dur Durable All Non-Dur Durable
OLS 0.29  0.04  0.03  0.04 0.27 0.08 0.19 0.02
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03)
OLS, no zeros 0.37  0.05  0.05  0.05 0.30 0.12 0.22 0.03
Median 0.33  0.00  0.01  0.00 0.23  0.00 0.09  0.01
Notes: Slope coecients from the regression of the change in log price on the change in log quantities across
HS 4-digit sectors. The sample is as described in the text, in particular, footnote 11 reports the number of
observations in each bin. Standard errors for OLS specication which includes all classied observations are
reported in brackets and  () indicates signicance at 1% (10%) level. `OLS, no zeros' specication carries
out the same exercise restricting the sample in each case only to sectors with a non-zero change in prices.
`Median' row reports the slope coecient from the robust quantile median regression run on the full sample
of sectors as in the baseline OLS specication.
Figure 5(a) is a scatterplot of the changes in import prices from August 2008 to March
2009 and trade values from June 2008 to June 2009, where blue circles correspond to 4-digit
sectors that contain non-dierentiated goods and red squares correspond to those containing
dierentiated goods.11 Once again, our basic results are highly robust to using alternative
time periods for measuring the change in trade prices and trade values.
Most squares and circles are located in the left half of the plot since most sectors exhib-
ited large declines in trade values (the median declines in import values for dierentiated
and non-dierentiated sectors were 22.1 and 39.9 percent). The two sectors clearly exhibit
dierent pricing behavior, however, as can be seen in the diering slopes of the lines tting
the circles and the squares and reported in Table 5. Non-dierentiated sectors experiencing
larger declines in values typically also experienced larger price declines, while this relation is
not found among dierentiated goods. Figure 5(b) shows the same relationships for exports.
Overall, heterogeneity in trade price changes can explain a sizable amount (about 30 per-
cent, as reected by the corresponding regression slopes) of the heterogeneity in trade value
changes for non-dierentiated goods, but zero of the heterogeneity in trade value changes
for dierentiated sectors.
11Among the 1209 4-digit import sectors for which we have data on quantities, price data is available for
567 sectors. We further exclude a few price and quantity changes which exceed 2 log points. This constitutes
our subsample. Within our subsample, 302 sectors are dierentiated and 149 sectors are non-dierentiated,
while the remaining 116 sectors are unclassied. For 56 dierentiated and 18 non-dierentiated sectors the
sectoral price change over the sample period is zero. Among the dierentiated sectors, 179 are durable, 96
are non-durable, and 27 are unclassied. Similar patterns hold for exports.
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(b) Exports: Values and Prices
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Figure 7: Kernel Densities of Adjustment in Durable and Non-Durables Sectors
Notes: Kernel densities for changes in log prices and log values across non-durable (blue dashed lines) and
durable (red solid lines) dierentiated sectors. Around 16% of sectors with zero price changes are excluded;
the qualitative patterns remain unchanged when these sectors are included.
Figure 6 considers the same analysis but now splits the dierentiated good subsample
into durable (red squares) and non-durable (blue circles) sectors. Though the blue dashed
line for non-durable exports is upward sloping, Table 5 shows that none of these four best
t lines is statistically dierent from zero (in fact, the slopes of the other three lines are pre-
cisely estimated zeros). This is unlike Figure 5, where both lines for the non-dierentiated
goods were statistically signicant. Variation in prices across durable and non-durable man-
ufactures does not systematically contribute to the dierential decline in trade values across
these two sectors.
Figure 7(a) plots the kernel densities of changes in import values and prices across durable
17and non-durable manufacturing sectors within the set of dierentiated goods over the same
period. Figure 7(b) plots these densities for exports. The distributions denoted with solid
lines in the left panels are clearly shifted to the left of the dotted lines, indicating that durable
sectors experienced signicantly larger import value declines. Specically, for dierentiated
imports, the median decline in sectoral trade values was 26.0 percent for durables and 14.7
percent for non-durables. The right panels, however, show price change distributions that are
almost identical for the case of imports and equally centered at zero in the case of exports.
In sum, even when considering the signicant heterogeneity present in levels of trade
adjustment at the 4-digit HS level, we nd that distinguishing between dierentiated and
non-dierentiated goods does a good job of characterizing the role played by price changes
in declining trade values. Additional information, such as the durability of the good, gives
information on the extent of the quantity decline, but not on the extent of the price decline.
3.6 Relation to Other Findings on the Trade Collapse
It is instructive here to compare our results to other papers that use more aggregated data on
prices or unit values. Our results are highly consistent with those reported from aggregated
sector-level price information by Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010). The sectors they report
as exhibitting the greatest price declines { Petroleum and products, Industrial supplies and
materials, and Foods, feeds, and beverages { are sectors less likely to contain dierentiated
goods than the remaining categories such as capital goods and consumer goods. Further,
within these dierentiated goods categories, Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) nd only
limited dierences in price changes between durables and non-durables, a key point of our
analysis above.
There has also been a focus on trade dynamics in the auto sector during the crisis, such
as the analysis in Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010b). Import and export prices for
overall and market transactions in HS 87, which includes cars and other vehicles (excluding
rail-, tram-, water-, and air-based vehicles), grew moderately in the years prior to the crisis
but remained highly stable from August 2008 through late 2009 despite a sharp reduction in
demand over that period. This is also consistent with the reporting by end-use in Levchenko,
Lewis, and Tesar (2010).
Chor and Manova (2012) follow Braun (2003), who derives from corporate nancial infor-
18mation measures of the \external nancial dependence" and \asset tangibility" as proxies for
a sector's credit sensitivity, and demonstrate that U.S. imports declined by more in response
to increases in an exporter's cost of capital when the sector was more credit sensitive.12
We obtained these measures at the 3-digit ISIC level from Manova (2012), concorded them
with our HS codes at the 2-digit level, and examined whether trade price changes from Au-
gust 2008 to March 2009 relate to the sector's credit sensitivity.13 There is no statistically
signicant relationship for external nancial dependence and trade price movements during
the crisis in our data, though with less than 25 data points, the power in such regressions
is limited. There is strong evidence that sectors with greater asset tangibility (and there-
fore, presumably, less of an increase in the cost of nancing) had signicantly more import
and export price reductions than sectors with few tangible assets. However, consistent with
the central result of our work, this result follows entirely from large price reductions in 2-
digit industries that are mostly non-dierentiated, such as Petroleum reneries, Paper and
products, and Iron and steel.
We also nd evidence corroborating the nding by Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein (2011)
that the price of manufacturing exports during the crisis increased relative to the price
of domestic manufacturing. As with our analysis of trade prices and asset tangibility, we
hypothesize that this movement in the relative price of exported goods to domestic sales is
concentrated in non-dierentiated sectors, and both domestic producer prices and import
prices of dierentiated goods remain mostly stable. A full assessment of this, however, would
require applying the Rauch classication to trade and domestic production categories across
multiple countries and is beyond the scope of this paper.
Haddad, Harrison, and Hausman (2010) look at the movement across several countries in
unit values, which they calculate at the 6-digit level. For dierentiated goods imported into
the United States, they nd that prices slightly increased. Behrens, Corcos, and Mion (2012)
look at unit values for trade with Belgium and nd that price declines played a moderate role
in the overall decline in Belgian trade. They consider dierences in the decline of trade values
for dierentiated and non-dierentiated goods, but do not consider the dierential behavior
of prices across those categories, nor do they compare changes in prices and quantities across
dierentiated sectors as we do.
12See Amiti and Weinstein (2010) for doubts about how well these measures capture the importance of
trade nancing for a sector.
13These results are available upon request from the authors.
19Our focus diers from all of these related papers in that we highlight that within dier-
entiated goods sectors, variation in trade values cannot be explained by variation in trade
prices. Further, we look at prices at the transaction level and therefore can be assured that
price changes do not reect dierences in quality that may inuence unit value calculations.14
4 The Mechanics of Price Adjustment
In this section, we make use of the micro data to understand how the evolution of price
stickiness, size of non-zero price changes, and product churning contributed to the dynamic
behavior of aggregate trade price indices.
4.1 Frequency and size of price adjustment
Figure 8 plots a 12-month moving average of the frequency of price adjustment, price in-
creases, and price decreases, for all import prices in panel (a) and for import prices of the
dierentiated goods only in panel (b).15 Figure A1 in the Appendix displays similar plots
for export prices. The solid blue line which captures the frequency of price decreases, for
example, is the percentage of total observed prices that are smaller than the previously ob-
served price. The percentage of prices which do not change equals one minus the value of
the dash-dotted black line, which itself equals the sum of the other two lines.
The frequency of price changes increased in the months of the recent crisis, for both
imports and exports. This holds to some extent even in the subsample of dierentiated
goods, but the eects there are less pronounced, and the frequency increase reverses for the
dierentiated imports in the middle of the recession. The most stark pattern, however, is the
increasing frequency of price decreases and the decreasing frequency of price increases. Quite
surprisingly given our earlier results, these patterns are comparably strong for dierentiated
goods as in the full sample, with the primary dierence between the two being the lower
average frequency of price adjustment for dierentiated goods. The frequency of increases
and decreases changes in opposite directions, which produces a more muted movement in
the frequency of total changes. This nding is consistent with Gagnon (2009), who demon-
14Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2011) examine whether the trade crisis brought a change in the quality of
goods imported into the U.S.
15Without smoothing, the series are too volatile and have very strong seasonality.
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Figure 8: Price Adjustment Frequencies
Notes: 12-month moving averages of monthly frequency of import price adjustment (black dash-dotted lines),
as well as its components, frequency of price increases (green dashed lines) and price decreases (blue solid
line).
strates this same phenomenon over business cycle uctuations during years of low ination
in Mexico.
The observed patterns are consistent with a state-dependent view of price adjustment be-
cause the adjustment frequencies appear to respond endogenously to the underlying shocks.
The patterns are also directionally consistent with a decline in the corresponding price in-
dices. However, the scale of these movements is quite small and does not stand out relative to
other high frequency swings in the series (such as seasonality in the raw series). For example,
in the months of the crisis, the moving average of the frequency of decreases reached its peak
at 10.7 percent while its pre-crisis low was 5.6 percent. Even the larger of the two frequencies
suggests signicant amounts of nominal rigidity, consistent with the stability of most trade
prices during the trade crisis. And in the dierentiated subsample, these frequencies are
signicantly lower still.
Berger and Vavra (2011) and Vavra (2012) show that price change frequencies and price
dispersion are correlated in the BLS micro data underlying the CPI. They document that the
latter has a strong countercyclical component. Their plots look at seasonally adjusted and
bandpass ltered data, unlike ours which simply show 12-month moving averages. While our
data is supportive of state-dependent adjustment, the magnitude of changes in the frequency
of price adjustment are relatively muted, particularly given the scale of the economic shock
and relative to seasonality in the data. Overall, the trade prices do not exhibit economically
large cyclical patterns in adjustment frequencies.
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Figure 9: Price Adjustment Magnitudes for Dierentiated Goods
Notes: 12-month moving averages of average absolute size of log price increases (green dashed lines) and
decreases (blue solid line), conditional on price adjustment.
Figure 9 plots a 12-month moving average of the average absolute size of price adjustment
and separates this measure for price increases and decreases. The left panel shows the results
for imports of dierentiated goods, while the right panel covers dierentiated goods exports.
The patterns are similar qualitatively for the full sample and for non-dierentiated goods
(not shown), but the magnitudes are signicantly larger for non-dierentiated goods.16
At the onset of recession, the absolute size of price adjustment increases for both price
hikes and price cuts, perhaps implying that that there was an increase in the dispersion
of cost shocks. Further into the recession, the average size of price decreases exceeds the
average size of price increases, although not by much. Coupled with uniformly low frequency
of both price increases and decreases, this explains why there was only a muted decline in
prices at the aggregate for dierentiated goods and why the distributions of price changes
for dierentiated goods in Figure 7 are centered around zero.
Finally, we note that the patterns of frequency and size of price adjustment that we
document for the current crisis were to some extent also observed during the 2001 recession
(with the exception of the trending decline in frequency in the early 2000s). During the
2001 recession, prices decreased more often and increased less often, while the absolute size
of price decreases (and increases in the case of imports) also went up.
16For example, the average absolute size of price decline for dierentiated goods increases from 6.4 percent
before the crisis to a peak of 9.0 percent in the months of the crisis, while in the full sample which incorporates
both dierentiated and non-dierentiated goods the average absolute size of price declines increase from 7.2
percent to 11.7 percent. It appears that the very large size of price decreases was the key driver of sharp
reduction in the price index of non-dierentiated goods.
224.2 Extensive Margin
As highlighted in Gopinath and Neiman (2012) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott
(2009), the bulk of high frequency trade adjustment takes place via the intensive margin. The
economy as a whole typically does not quickly stop importing or exporting products which
previously accounted for a large share of trade. The BLS data we use are not well equipped
to evaluate the importance of the extensive margin for aggregate adjustment because it is
sampled and constitutes only a small subset of total U.S. trade. Nonetheless, we now consider
whether the churning of products with prices surveyed by the BLS changed at all during the
recession.
Figure 10(a) plots the 12-month moving average of the number of product entries and
exits relative to the total number of products in the previous period. Both entry and exit
rates are low, averaging 3 to 4 percent in any given month. There is some evidence of an
increase in product churn during the recent recession, as both entry and exit rates increased
by 1 to 2 percent, but this trend is not quantitatively pronounced. The highest level of
product exits in the recent recession still remained quantitatively similar to the levels seen
throughout the 2000s and the rate of product entry hovered near its sample average. Fig-
ure 10(b) disaggregates the dierentiated good exit rate between arm's length and intrarm
trades. There is some evidence in other measures that intrarm and arm's length trades
responded somewhat dierently to the crisis, but their patterns of dierentiated product
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Figure 10: Product Extensive Margin for Dierentiated Goods in BLS Data
Notes: 12-month moving averages of product exit and entry to continuation ratios. Blue solid line in both
panels corresponds to the market exit ratio; green dashed line in Panel (a) corresponds to market entry ratio;
red dashed line in Panel (b) corresponds to related-party exit ratio.
23discontinuation appear highly similar. In sum, it appears unlikely that the conclusions we
draw from comparisons of BLS prices, which would not capture extensive margin adjust-
ment, with trade values obtained from U.S. customs data, which do reect extensive margin
adjustments, are impacted by rm or product churning during the recession.
5 Conclusion
Starting in the summer of 2008, the dollar value of international trade plunged relative to the
scale of economic activity and was likely the biggest such decline since the Great Depression.
A large literature has characterized this Great Trade Collapse of 2008-2009 and built models
seeking to explain the decline and relate it to the broader global recession. Prior studies
which approximate prices by measuring unit values at more aggregated levels may conate
price changes with changes in the composition or quality of traded goods. Relative to this
literature, we oer new information on the behavior of U.S. trade prices, measured at the
individual good level.
This micro data allows us to focus on the dierence between dierentiated and non-
dierentiated goods, and we show that this distinction is crucial for understanding the extent
to which price declines contributed to the decline in trade values. Though price declines
contributed to the overall trade collapse, the sharp reduction in dierentiated goods trade was
entirely a quantity-driven phenomenon. The typical dierentiated manufacturing good sector
shipped 30 percent less physical goods across the U.S. border without any corresponding
reduction in the price of those goods. This stability of trade prices was equally apparent
in dierentiated durables and non-durables sectors, even though the decline in trade values
was far more dramatic for durables. In contrast, dierences in price changes can explain a
moderate share of the dierent trade patterns in the non-dierentiated sectors.
Lastly, we explore the mechanics of price changes such as the size of changes, their
frequency, and the relative share of price increases and decreases, and show how these char-
acteristics of pricing dynamics all changed with the onset of the trade crisis. Although the
patterns we document are supportive of the state-dependent view of price adjustment, they
are not pronounced enough to noticeably aect the aggregate price indexes for dierentiated
goods.
24A Additional results
Table A1: Changes in Export Prices and Values, by Type and End-Use (%)
Prices Values
All Non-Di Di All Non-Di Di
All  4.4  15.7  0.6  26.8  31.1  34.7
Non-manufactures (S)  14.4  12.6  17.9  40.8  30.7  41.2
Non-durables (N)  8.4  11.7  3.4  14.5  24.3  15.9
Durables (D)  2.0  31.2 0.4  28.8  42.2  38.3
Consumption-N  9.2  11.2  8.4  11.2  18.9  14.7
Intermediate-N  0.2  0.5 4.9  14.1  16.1  3.5
Capital-D  0.2 | 0.8  23.5 |  51.4
Consumption-D 0.0 | 0.3  19.3 |  19.6
Intermediate-D  19.8  33.7  4.7  42.8  46.2  26.4
Notes: Changes in prices are calculated between August 2008 and September 2009; changes in values are cal-
culated between June 2008 and June 2009. The data contains no non-dierentiated capital and consumption
durable goods.
(a) All Exports
2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 2009
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
all changes
increases
decreases
(b) Dierentiated Exports
2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 2009
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
increases
all changes
decreases
Figure A1: Price Adjustment Frequencies for Exports
Notes: 12-month moving averages of monthly frequency of export price adjustment (black dash-dotted lines),
as well as its components, frequency of price increases (green dashed lines) and price decreases (blue solid
line).
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